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Abstract 
Timely detection of a bioaerosol event is emerging as a fundamental step in an effective 
response against biological weapons'. We utilized an enterprise model to examine the 
impact of detection time and various response strategies on population fatality rates for 
several attack scenarios. We show that prompt distribution of prophylaxis, best achieved 
through earlier detection by bioaerosol detectors, is the most gainful strategy for reducing 
overall numbers of fatalities in an outdoor aerosolized anthrax attack. Maintaining a high 
level of prophylaxis compliance in the population is also advantageous, while other 
improvements to hospital surge capacity and treatment efficacy are less critical. A 
sensitivity analysis on detection time shows that earlier detection by bioaerosol detectors 
provides a consistent, significant gain in lives saved over all considered attack and 
response scenarios. 
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Earlier Detection in Emergency Response 
to an Anthrax Attack 
1. Introduction 
An outdoor attack of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores on a major urban area could 
have devastating health consequences for the area population2. Using an enterprise 
model, the Weapons of Mass Destruction - Decision Analysis Center (WMD-DAC) 
Biological Defense Application, we examined a range of attack scenarios and analyzed 
the effect of earlier detection and different response strategies on scenario outcomes, 
namely numbers of fatalities. We show that fatality rates could be reduced significantly if 
public health officials received indications of an attack early enough to respond 
aggressively with a mass antibiotic prophylaxis campaign. 
2. Materials and Methods 
Detection of an anthrax attack through public health surveillance3 relies on the 
manifestation of symptoms in the population2. The incubation time for anthrax typically 
ranges from 2 - 11 days, but can be much shorter or longer depending on factors such as 
a person’s cumulative dose and ~usceptibility~’~. Thus, an attack is not likely to be 
detected through public health surveillance until several days after the initial release2. 
Present day bioaerosol detection systems, such as BioWatch6, may shorten detection 
time. For this study, we assumed that a bioaerosol detection system would be capable of 
detecting an anthrax attack one day after the initial release and a public health 
surveillance system would detect the attack two days after the initial release3. 
Once detection has occurred, there is a time delay before distribution of prophylaxis may 
begin. Depending on a city’s bio-terrorism response preparedness, delays due to the 
decision-making process and the logistics of setting up prophylaxis points of distribution 
(PODS) may be one to two days (according to internal studies by Frederic M. Leykam 
and Larry C. Madsen for the Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology 
Directorate). For this analysis, we assume that this delay is one day. Therefore, in our 
model, with a bioaerosol detection system in place, mass prophylaxis distribution first 
begins two days after an anthrax release; with no detection system in place, distribution 
starts three days after the simulated release. 
For this study, the simulated geography is a generic regional grid. As shown in Figure 1, 
this grid consists of an urban area of approximately 1,100 square kilometers and a rural 
area of about 6,000 square kilometers. These areas are divided into census tracts that are 
uniformly populated. The total population is 6.4 million, with 5.8 million people in the 
urban area and 0.6 million in the rural area. We used a population density that is 
representative of the densities of the 20 most populated U.S. metropolitan areas per the 
2000 U.S. Census. 
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Figure 1. Urban census tracts are 4x4 km and have a population density 
of 5,000 peoplelkm’. The rural area is divided into 9x9 km census tracts 
with a population density of 100 peoplelkm’. 
On the day of the attack, anthrax spores are released from a point source in a central 
urban census tract. A percentage of these spores are aerosolized and travel downwind. 
We assumed meteorological conditions that would cause a large area of exposure in the 
region. The dispersion model, the Hazard Prediction Assessment Capability (HPAC)’, 
generates a plume with cumulative dosage contours that is mapped onto the simulated 
geography. This dosage data is folded into a probabilistic infection model and used to 
determine whether a simulated individual has been infected based on his exposure. 
Infections due to the re-aerosolization of deposited anthrax spores were not considered. 
Once an attack is detected, one day is required for a public health officer to decide to 
distribute prophylaxis, alert the population, request and receive supplies from the 
Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), and activate PODS*. People begin receiving 
antibiotics one day after an attack is detected at a fixed daily rate until there are no longer 
people in the queue. 
In WMD-DAC, people can be in one of six states of disease progression: uninfected, 
infected, mildly symptomatic, severely symptomatic, dead, and recovered. An infected 
individual’s disease progression is calculated as a probability function based on 
incubation models that were developed from historical data’. The probability of 
progressing to a different disease stage is altered if a person receives antibiotic 
prophylaxis or hospital care. Even if antibiotics are made available, some people may not 
10-11,12 comply with the direction for prophylaxis . Full prophylaxis compliance is defined 
as complete adherence to the treatment schedule and completion of the entire course of 
prophylactic antibiotics. It is assumed that infected people who are fully compliant will 
not develop symptoms and will eventually recover. In other words, with full compliance, 
antibiotic prophylaxis is assumed to be 100 percent effective. If an infected person has 
not received prophylaxis or is non-compliant, he will eventually develop mild nonspecific 
flu-like symptoms and progress to the severe symptoms (e.g., sudden fever, dyspnea, 
diaphoresis, and shock) of the fulminant disease stage*. 
It is assumed that people with mild symptoms remain in the antibiotics queue at PODS 
until they receive prophylaxis or become severely symptomatic. Oral antibiotics are 
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modeled as not effective in halting the disease progression of people with mild 
 symptom^^'^. Mildly symptomatic people are not given hospital care5. 
People experiencing severe symptoms do not seek prophylaxis; instead, they immediately 
seek a hospital intensive care unit (ICU) bed. In the scenario, each census tract has 10 
available ICU beds to start13. ICU beds are available on a first-come, first-served basis to 
severely symptomatic members of the population residing within a hospital's census 
tract. The maximum ICU residence time for a severely symptomatic hospital patient is 14 
days5. If a person becomes severely symptomatic at a time when all ICU beds are full, he 
cannot wait for a bed to become available. Instead, he is given a general bed without 
critical care resources and eventually dies. 
People who are uninfected after an attack still queue at PODs if directed by the public 
health officer, since they do not know that they are uninfected. They remain in the queue 
until they receive prophylaxis. 
WMD-DAC tracks population states of health, population behavior, and resource 
utilization statistics on a daily basis for three months following an attack. In this study, 
the scenario parameters listed in Table 1 were varied to determine their effects on the 
total number of fatalities. 
Parameter 
Prophylaxis 
distribution 
strategy 
Detection date 
Attack size 
Infection model 
Epidemic model: 
Incubation period 
Prophylaxis 
comdiance rate 
Table 1. Parameter values varied in this study. 
Values 
Baseline 
60-day supply distributed 
by PODs; 3 days to 
distribute antibiotics; 1 day 
delay to set up and supply 
PODs 
Day 2 after an anthrax 
release 
100 grams aerosolized 
anthrax spores 
Glassman' 
Lognormal model 
90% 
All Variations 
60-day supply distributed by PODs; 3 days to 
distribute antibiotics; 1 day delay to set up 
and supply PODs 
Unlimited supply of prophylaxis on shelf, 
distributed before an attack and ready to be 
taken immediately 
Day 0, 1, 2 or 3 after an anthrax release 
1, 10, 100 or 1000 grams aerosolized anthrax 
spores 
Age-dependent model used by Wein et a/.* 
Glassman 
Exponential model 
Lognormal model 
Truncated lognormal model 
80,90 or 100% 
' Glassman, H.N., (1966) Bacteriological Reviews, 30,657-9. 
Webb, G. F., & Blaser, M. (2002) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sei. USA 10,7027-32. 
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Hospital treatment 55%; 10 available critical 0, 55 or 100% 
effectiveness and 
capacity census tract 
care beds per census tract 10 or 340 available critical care beds per 
3. Results 
Ensuring that most of the population is able to begin an antibiotic regimen before 
developing symptoms is expected to mitigate the consequences of widespread anthrax 
exposure. In the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks, of the thousands of potentially exposed 
people who were treated before the onset of symptoms, there were no recorded deaths; of 
the 11 people who received medical treatment after showing symptoms, six recovered5. 
People who were infected had significantly improved chances of recovery if medical 
treatment was administered to them before their symptoms appeared. Given that the 
incubation time for anthrax could be less than two  day^^'^, initiating a prophylaxis 
campaign in the first few days after an attack is critical to reducing fatality rates. In 
Figure 2, the numbers of fatalities resulting from the baseline attack scenario are shown 
for varying delays to the start of prophylaxis distribution. For every additional day of 
delay before prophylaxis distribution begins, the number of fatalities rises at an 
increasing rate. Likewise, the recovery rate (percentage of infected people who 
eventually recover) decreases at a greater rate within the first few days following an 
anthrax release, as shown in Figure 3. 
If the bioaerosol detector architecture detects an attack one day earlier than public health 
surveillance, prophylaxis distribution may begin a day earlier. This is predicted to result 
in up to a 24 percent reduction in the numbers of fatalities (12,000 fewer fatalities) for the 
baseline case. It is possible that once an attack is detected, the process of deciding to 
distribute prophylaxis and setting up PODS may take up to two days". In this situation, 
earlier detection (Le., starting prophylaxis distribution three days after an attack, as 
compared to four days) is predicted to result in a 27 percent decrease in the number of 
fatalities (1 9,000 fewer fatalities). 
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Figure 2. Fatality rates increase with longer delays to prophylaxis 
distribution: overall number of fatalities vs. day that prophylaxis 
distribution begins for the baseline case. Prophylaxis distribution 
prompted by a bioaerosol detection system is expected to start on Day 2. 
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Figure 3. Recovery rate decreases if there is a longer delay before 
prophylaxis distribution: percentage of people infected with anthrax that 
recover for the baseline case. Prophylaxis distribution prompted by a 
bioaerosol detection system is expected to start on Day 2. 
These results show that faster detection by present day bioaerosol detector systems can 
greatly reduce mortality, provided that public health officials have enough information 
and confidence in the data to decide quickly to conduct a mass prophylaxis campaign. 
Given the multiple logistical steps that delay the start of prophylaxis distribution, saving 
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time through earlier detection can be important for reducing the number of fatalities in an 
anthrax attack. In a scenario in which public health officials are not certain enough in a 
biosensor alarm to immediately respond with mass prophylaxis, the alarm may be 
sufficient for lower-regret actions to be taken while the initial detection is being 
confirmed. By getting a head start on logistical actions like activating the Strategic 
National Stockpile14, prophylaxis distribution can begin sooner if the alarm is confirmed 
and public health officials decide to respond. 
In a previous investigation, Wein et al. used a mathematical model to compare 
emergency responses to outdoor airborne anthrax at ta~ks’~.  They concluded that, 
“modestly rapid and sensitive biosensors, while helpful, produce only second-order 
improvements [to emergency response].” Wein et aZ. made a fixed assumption that 
antibiotics are distributed to the population prior to the attack, enabling the entire 
population to begin prophylaxis immediately in the event of a detected attack. Present- 
day public health policy is that prophylaxis would be distributed only after an attack is 
detected”. This assumption by Wein et al. may have predisposed their conclusion about 
the value of early detection to be comparatively low, as supported by the data in Figure 2. 
To estimate the value of early detection by bioaerosol detectors, Wein et aZ. assumed that 
if detectors are deployed, detection would occur one day after an attack and the entire 
population would begin prophylaxis on the same day; with no detectors deployed, both 
detection and prophylaxis would occur two days after an attack. 
Comparing these cases using WMD-DAC, the value of detectors is calculated to be 
approximately 40 percent less for the Wein et al. scenario than for our baseline case that 
includes representative delays. Gains due to earlier detection are less significant in 
scenarios in which prophylaxis distribution delays are shorter or non-existent. This result 
also implies that improvements in biosensor technology that further reduce detection time 
could lead to additional gains in recovery rates. 
In addition to rapid initiation of prophylaxis distribution, the population’s prophylaxis 
compliance rate (i.e., the fraction of the population that adheres to the ordered antibiotics 
regimen) was also found to have a large effect on the number of fatalities resulting fi-om 
an anthrax attack. In Figure 4, fatalities calculated for the baseline case scenario are 
shown for three prophylaxis compliance rates: 80,90 and 100 percent. For the 100-gram 
release scenario, in which compliance is assumed to be 90 percent, increasing this 
number to 100 percent causes the number of fatalities to decrease by half. By increasing 
compliance rates, such as through public education and awareness campaigns, fatality 
rates resulting from an anthrax attack can be reduced significantly. 
Furthermore, by increasing compliance rates, greater gains are achieved by deploying 
bioaerosol detectors because a larger percentage of infected people would benefit from 
earlier prophylaxis distribution. Figure 5 illustrates the reduction in fatalities if detectors 
detect an attack for the three compliance rates considered. If the prophylaxis compliance 
rate is increased from 90 to 100 percent, the reduction in fatalities from deploying 
detectors increases from 2 1,000 to 26,000. 
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Figure 4. Improving the population’s prophylaxis compliance rate can 
significantly reduce the number of fatalities: numbers of fatalities vs. 
attack size, for various prophylaxis compliance rates. 
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Figure 5. Early detection achieves greater gains when compliance rate is 
higher: numbers of fatalities vs. attack size, for various prophylaxis 
compliance rates, for scenarios with and without detectors deployed. 
Compared to prophylaxis compliance rates, we found that the effectiveness of hospital 
intensive care has a low impact of the overall number of fatalities and the calculated 
value of early detection by bioaerosol detectors in an anthrax release. A small number of 
intensive care unit (ICU) beds-2.3~10" per capita-are available for anthrax patients. 
Furthermore, the average residence time in an ICU bed for an anthrax patient is about 14 
days'. Thus, only a small fraction of severely symptomatic patients receives intensive 
care treatment and increasing the hospital treatment effectiveness results in little change 
to the overall number of fatalities. The relative importance of prophylaxis compliance 
and hospital treatment effectiveness on the value of early detection is shown in Figure 6. 
It appears that because orders of magnitude more people can be given prophylaxis than 
can be treated in hospitals, prophylaxis compliance rate is a much stronger determinant of 
scenario outcomes than hospital treatment effectiveness. 
In most attack scenarios, a large increase in the number of hospital ICU beds is required 
for the overall number of fatalities to decrease significantly. In the baseline scenario, 30 
times more ICU beds in the urban census tracts results in a 17 uercent reduction in 
number of fatalities. 
i z] . . . . . . .  '. . . '  
Figure 6. Effectiveness of hospital ICU care has a comparatively low impact 
on scenario outcomes, because very few people receive hospital care: 
numbers of fatalities vs. attack size for various compliance rates and hospital 
effectiveness rates. 
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4. Discussion 
Rapid initiation of prophylaxis distribution, enabled through earlier detection by 
bioaerosol detectors, along with promotion of prophylaxis compliance in the population 
are the most effective strategies for reducing overall numbers of fatalities in an outdoor 
aerosolized anthrax attack. This can be seen in Figure 7, in which the relative effect of 
different response strategies on total numbers of fatalities in the baseline case scenario is 
shown. While prophylaxis compliance rate stands out as a key driver in our model, it is 
difficult to predict with much certainty the impact of educational programs on the 
population's compliance rate in the event of an attack. In the 2001 U S .  anthrax attacks, 
of the postal workers that were known to potentially have been exposed to anthrax only 
40 percent adhered to the full course ofprophylactic treatment". Similarly, it may not be 
feasible to implement some of the idealized response strategies included in our analysis, 
such as pre-attack distribution of antibiotics or an order of magnitude increase in ICU 
resources. Given these infeasibilities and the uncertainty in prophylaxis compliance rate, 
taking additional response measures, including deployment of bio-detectors, creates a 
more robust strategy for response. 
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Figure 7. Relative impacts of study parameters on the number of 
fatalities in the baseline scenario. (CT = census tract) 
The value of early detection by bioaerosol detectors was found to be consistently high for 
the range of scenarios that we considered. In Figure 8, the relative effect of different 
response strategies and assumptions on this calculated value is shown. The timeliness of 
prophylaxis distribution and prophylaxis compliance are key factors that determine 
whether the full benefit of earlier detection is achieved. One important assumption is the 
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disease incubation time. Although we considered three commonly employed anthrax 
incubation models, incubation times for people who receive very high or very low doses 
are not well understood, and need to be studied further. If the onset of symptom occurs 
much earlier or later than what is currently known, then this could affect the relative 
value of early detection by detectors in some cases. 
Immediately following an anthrax attack, every additional day’s delay to the start of 
prophylaxis causes the fatality rate to rise at an increasing rate. Detection of an anthrax 
attack is one of many delays before prophylaxis distribution can begin, and time saved 
through biosensor detection can significantly reduce fatality rates. 
Figure 8. Relative impacts of study parameters on percent reduction in 
fatalities due to early detection in the baseline scenario. (CT = census 
tract) 
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